Senior Essay Library

Preface: Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents an opportunity to fundamentally improve human society. Though most AI use today is in the private sector, governments around the world have already begun to use AI for various tasks. AI in the public sector can dramatically increase government’s ability to serve citizens. Legitimacy is a crucial facet of government. A legitimate government is one with the genuine authority to subject its citizens to its decisions. Countless theories of legitimacy have been proposed, each with unique criteria that government must meet to be legitimate. Can the governmental use of AI be legitimate? This is the general question motivating this paper. Answering in the affirmative requires the legitimation of AI, an assurance that AI use in the public sector meets the criteria of legitimacy. Various theories of legitimacy have proposed an explainability criterion in which governments would need to provide explanations behind political decisions to be legitimate. There is also a well-studied explainability problem with AI where it is difficult and even impossible to acquire explanations for an AI’s decisions. The intersection of this necessity for and lack of explainability presents a serious issue for the legitimation of AI. Recent research from Beckman et al. has begun to explore this question. It is my contention that it is possible for government to be legitimate and use AI, but to do so government must employ explainable AI. In this paper I hope to show the gravity of the AI explainability problem as it pertains to legitimacy, and illustrate the methods through which government can use explainable AI. Part I will draw from philosophy and social science to discuss two types of legitimacy theories, liberal and realist, and show how explainability is a desirable and even necessary criterion for both theories. I will argue that a compelling legitimacy theory expects government, at the very least, to have the ability to provide explanations for their decisions. Part II will draw from the most recent research AI and explainability to lay out the AI explainability problem and discuss solutions that exist for creating explainable AI. I will argue that though explainability problem is real and significant, there are potential solutions than can remediate some concerns. Part III will combine the previous two parts and discuss whether these solutions to AI explainability are sufficient to meet the explainability requirement of legitimacy. I will argue that this is possible, but currently difficult. Continued expansion of AI in the public sector must come with the intentional implementation of explainable AI. AI has the potential to significantly improve governments, but this must be done so with respect to the legitimacy of these governments. AI’s explainability problem poses a specific issue to government legitimacy. The legitimation of AI is crucial to the future of the public sector. What follows is one step towards legitimation and thus better governance.

The efforts of the international financial community on behalf of Argentina when that country entered extreme financial distress in late 2001 can be interpreted as inadequate; intervention did not prevent crisis. But evaluated in the context of the precise duty the international community owed to Argentina, the work of the IMF and US Treasury may have been generous. This paper identifies several important causes of the 2001 financial crisis in historical and theoretical terms, starting with the dramatic market reforms of the early 1990s. Actual outcomes of key policy decisions are compared with expected results predicted by economic theory. An analysis of government revenue and expenditure data shows that the most persistent problem facing the Argentine economy was the size of the central government’s debt. Servicing that debt destroyed primary budget surpluses and ultimately imperiled the country’s economy. Judged using a normative framework inspired by Rawls’ “Duty of Assistance,” Argentina’s crisis appears to be its own responsibility; the international community fulfilled its moral obligations to the country in rescuing it from crisis in 1990. Notwithstanding this conclusion, more demanding views of global justice may still find the international community at fault.

I. Introduction We shape our buildings, some have said, and then our buildings shape us.1 If true, architects who design schools also help design the education that happens within them. “The architect,” wrote one of the most influential school architects of the post-war period, Lawrence Perkins, “must fashion a tool for the teacher.”2 But the right tool for the job is not a simple choice. Even as educators debate the methods and purpose of education, architects must fashion tools that are fixed in concrete. Buildings constrain class size, teaching style, and curriculum. Spaces of different size and shape accommodate lectures, discussions, group work, or private learning. Some spaces, like wood shops or science laboratories, enable the study of subjects that cannot be fully studied otherwise. The schoolhouse, however, is more than a tool for teachers and students; it is an instrument for political communities who seek to project their civic character and strength. School buildings signal to parents, neighbors, and potential newcomers the values of a place. Across two centuries of economic and political change, school buildings have resembled churches, factories, and corporate office parks. An outmoded schoolhouse suggests a community that is either proudly traditionalist or simply well past its prime. In the utopic vision of modern architects like Frank Lloyd Wright, then, the final “agent of the state … in matters affecting the harmony of the whole, is the architect.” These two demands, that the inside of the school building work for students and that the outside work for citizens, are difficult to satisfy in a single work of architecture. Trusting a single architect to satisfy student and community interests risks leaving both unsatisfied. If schoolhouses truly shape learning, and civic buildings truly shape citizens, perhaps teachers and citizens should have a greater role in making school architecture. And if problems in educational achievement and civic commitment are indeed so complex, perhaps we should be satisfied with renovations that make knowable and modest improvements to the school buildings we already have before attempting new masterworks with unknown consequence. New Haven presents an opportunity to compare two historic efforts to improve schools and communities by improving school buildings, and to see how the constraints of the design process mattered for the success of the design in both respects. These comparative case studies show how the pursuit of a utopic vision takes place in a political economy that can exploit, compromise, or reject that vision, but in all likelihood never realize it. This paper begins with an overview comparing the school construction efforts of Mayor Richard C. Lee (1954-1969) and Mayor John D. DeStefano, Jr. (1994-Present). Each mayor undertook the most expensive per-capita school construction project of his respective era, and each undertaking raises questions about how political economy shapes schoolhouse architecture, and how the schoolhouse then shapes students and communities. The next section of the paper introduces the disciplinary tools of schoolhouse design theory through a brief history of schoolhouses in New Haven until 1947. Now prepared for our case studies, we begin with Mayor Lee’s program of schoolhouse construction through urban renewal. The financial and political regime of renewal encouraged total, rather than incremental, design undertaken by exclusive, rather than inclusive, designers for the benefit of multiple and conflicting clients. The resulting buildings were superficially and substantively at odds with those who worked in and lived around them. A close look at the design of Conte School reveals these problems in detail. We next turn towards Mayor DeStefano’s program of local school renovation and magnet school new construction. Whereas the renovations disciplined the design process by encouraging incremental improvements undertaken in consultation with those who used the buildings, the new construction of magnet schools recapitulated many of urban renewal’s problems. It led to total design undertaken in service of competing clients (the distant students who would attend the schools, and the local communities who would host them, sometimes unwillingly). Returning to the site of Conte School reveals some of the benefits of renovation work; even when a relatively exclusive design process goes forward, its results are at least no less offensive (and often better) than what was there before. This paper argues that all design work presents two major problems identified by political science: information and agency problems. Designers have imperfect knowledge, and designers are imperfectly responsive to the sometimes multiple clients they serve. This paper’s case studies suggest that renovation solves these problems more readily than can new construction, and that policymakers might consider incentivizing renovation over new construction in grant programs. Renovation enables designers to make knowable improvements for educators inside the building, and compels them to preserve continuity with civic communities outside the building. Further, a citywide building program biased towards renovation will maintain the number of schools near present numbers, a conservative approach that prepares the district for future years when it may be difficult to fully fund schools if budgets or demographics shift beyond expectations. The paper’s case studies also suggest that political economy drives these design choices. Future state or federal policymakers convinced by these arguments might consider making grants for school demolition-and-rebuilding and for new construction relatively less generous than grants for renovation. This cost burden would internalize in local decisionmaking bodies the risks of designing new buildings given human fallibility and hubris.

This essay will attempt to trace how the changing relationships between the state, ruling elites, organized urban citizens, rural and urban non-elites, and international development organizations have interacted over time to shape policy-making in Senegal from independence until the present day. The emphasis will be on the role of international development organizations in these interactions. Doing this will allow the paper to answer the larger question of how, given the effectiveness (and limitations) of the ways in which these organizations currently interact with and try to influence the state, the former should act going forward to positively influence policymaking in Senegal. It will do so by looking at the relative pressures and influences all of the aforementioned parties have had on the Senegalese state since 1960 and the resulting policy decisions that were made and implemented. This essay will show that in the 1960s and 1970s under Léopold Senghor, the Senegalese state was heavily based on neopatrimonialism, and ruling elites had the most influence on state policymaking. In the 1980s and 1990s, the increasing power of international development organizations, especially the Breton Woods Institutions, as well as increased democratization, meant that policymaking was the hybrid result of the goals of international development organizations, organized urban citizens, and ruling elites. It is important to note that during this time, the presence of international development organizations did not completely alter the state’s neopatrimonial character. That is, although the state had to balance the desires of ruling elites against that of international development organizations (as well as organized urban citizens), it still maintained its neopatrimonial relationships with ruling elites. ‐3‐ This essay will show that the decreasing influence of international development organizations (a result of both deliberate actions and the changing aid environment) may increase the relative influence of ruling elites and organized urban citizens on the state. It will do so by analyzing the influence international development organizations have via their (1) financial resources (2) expertise and ability to sensibiliser1 government officials, and (3) ability to act in concert with other international development organizations, as well as civil society groups. This decreasing influence of international development organizations may be beneficial to long-term sustainable development in the sense that these organizations were not necessarily successful by their own goals and standards even when they had more influence. However, it is also problematic. The trouble appears from looking at the historical progression of state interactions with other stakeholders since 1960. This paper’s analysis of that progression shows that decreasing pressure from international development organizations will not necessarily make the state more democratic or better at producing effective development policies for the majority of the Senegalese people. Instead, this decreasing pressure may leave more room for ruling elites and organized urban citizens to exert pressure on the state to make policy that benefits their particular group. Therefore, this paper will conclude that in order to make sure that Senegal continues to develop both economically and politically in an inclusive manner, international development organizations should make it a priority to empower and educate the people they aim to help – especially rural and urban non-elites –to enable these groups to have more access to and 1 Sensibiliser is French for “to make [the subject] aware of something, or to raise [the subject’s] awaremess of something.” However, in this context, it includes organizations presenting information on key issues to government officials, as well as providing the government with strategic technical assistance in the NGOs area of expertise or interest. ‐4‐ influence over the state.2 In this way international development organizations can work so that Senegal’s future is one where the state is accountable to more of its people in crafting and implementing policy, and works to promote the development of the entire country.

Email Kellianne Farnham for a copy of the introduction for this paper.

Abstract: This essay examines the survival tactics1 of Russian nonprofits and independent media outlets that have been forcibly labelled a “foreign agent” by the Russian government. I focus on the foreign agent disclosure notice required of so-called “agents” and argue that this requirement creates two ethical and economic dilemmas for affected organizations. “Foreign agent” organizations must choose (i) between principled rejections of the “foreign agent” label and the financial penalties this would entail, and (ii) between continued transparency about its international affiliations and the potential of further crackdown under the law. Through textual and visual analyses of the disclosure notices on the organizations’ websites, I argue that “foreign agent” organizations have used the format of the disclosure notice to resolve these dilemmas, as well as to resist both the normative meaning and the financial impact of the foreign agent law. While organizations employ diverse tactics, I focus in particular on the way in which they use web design to create normative appeals that reject the label of a “foreign agent” and encourage the reader to donate to their organization. I contend that these forms of resistance demonstrate not only the ingenuity of civil society actors in navigating an increasingly fraught external environment, but also serve as a diagnostic of power in understanding the changing ways that the foreign agent law has been used to hobble and decimate the activities of independent organizations in Russia.

This essay seeks to evaluate the potential expansion of Tweed-New Haven Airport in the context of regional land use planning (or the lack thereof) in Connecticut.  The issue has been controversial for at least two reasons: the destruction of wetlands involved and the disturbance expansion would cause in the surrounding New Haven and East Haven neighborhoods.  This essay focuses on the former, though the two objections to expansion are intertwined. The debate over the expansion of the airport occurs within the context of Connecticut, its history and its present situation.  The first section of the essay reviews Connecticut’s basic governmental structure and history of control.  It also examines the specific history and current status of Tweed airport and the wetlands surrounding it.  Groups from the federal government down to small neighborhood and environmental groups, from federal agencies to state agencies to local municipalities, have all gotten involved in determining the future of Tweed.  The second section of the essay investigates Tweed’s Master Plan for expansion and inventories the groups involved in the debate.  Today, these groups are in a deadlock.  Although the first step of the Master Plan seems ready to begin, there is little hope for future expansion, given the current governmental situation.  The third section of the essay analyzes the problems with these governmental structures and proposes possible solutions. Finally, although the best outcome of the debate remains ambiguous, the essay arrives at overriding conclusion: the state must get involved in the expansion debate for decisions to be made in the best interest of the region.  State involvement is the key to ending the current stalemate and bringing the debate over the future of the airport to the best conclusion for all parties involved.

In this essay, I examine the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) through two different lenses.  First, I discuss the dynamic relationship between the tribunals and international politics.  International politics has shaped the prospects and possibilities of the ICTY and the ICTR, but the ad hoc tribunals have had a significant impact on international politics as well.  Most importantly, the tribunals have struck a considerable blow against the culture of impunity that has historically allowed notorious war criminals such as Pol Pot and Idi Amin to go unpunished.   Second, I examine the ad hoc tribunals’ accomplishments and failures and attempt to draw lessons that may be of use to future international courts.  The international community’s expectations for the ICTY and the ICTR were highly unrealistic.  Although the tribunals have expounded on important principles of international humanitarian law, they have had little impact on the war-torn societies for which they were created.  When possible, domestic trials or prosecutions before “hybrid courts,” which employ a mixture of foreign and domestic lawyers and judges and are located in the country where the crimes to be prosecuted occurred, are often preferable to trials before purely international tribunals.  Still, international tribunals such as the ICC continue to have an important role to play in bringing perpetrators to justice.  Trials before international tribunals strengthen international norms by signaling the international community’s condemnation of atrocities.  Furthermore, the threat of international prosecutions may deter some political elites from engaging in genocide and other crimes against humanity.  Two fundamental tensions continually reemerge in my analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR.  The first is the tension between law and politics.  Judicial bodies are traditionally thought of as apolitical institutions.  In the words of Hannah Arendt, “The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else.”   The Security Council, however, intended for the ICTR and the ICTY to contribute to the political goal of maintaining international peace and security.  Furthermore, since the ad hoc tribunals lack their own police forces to collect evidence and arrest indicted individuals, they rely on international cooperation and are thus significantly affected by international politics.  The ad hoc tribunals, however, have also had an impact on international politics by generating substantial international pressure to hold suspected war criminals accountable for their crimes.  International politics has shaped the international tribunals, but the tribunals have shaped international politics as well.  The second tension is between the tribunals’ different audiences.  From the time of their establishment, the ICTY and the ICTR have been asked to meet the needs of two distinct constituencies.  First, the tribunals are supposed to serve an “international audience” that cares primarily about the tribunals’ contributions to the growth and development of international law.  Although this international audience is primarily composed of academics and other international law experts, it also includes a number of human-rights activists, politicians, and other individuals who support the further expansion and codification of international norms.  The members of this constituency want the ICTY and the ICTR to serve as positive precedents for future international tribunals, so they are deeply concerned about the ad hoc tribunals’ international legitimacy and their reputation for independence and impartiality.  Since this international audience is the primary source of the tribunals’ moral, political, and financial support, the tribunals must be particularly sensitive to this group’s needs and wishes.  Second, the tribunals are also supposed to fulfill the needs of a “national audience”: the people of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  Although the interests of the tribunals’ two constituencies generally overlap, they do not always coincide.  When conflict has occurred, the tribunals have often appeared more concerned about advancing international law than they have about fostering national reconciliation in Rwanda and the Balkans.

The proposed International Criminal Court (ICC) promises to usher in a new era of universal justice. By crushing impunity and imposing justice on all who commit war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, the ICC aims to bring to trial alleged criminals that manage to evade prosecution on a national level. Yet there are some serious criticisms of the Court structure outlined in the 1998 Rome Treaty that threaten to undermine the American ratification effort and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the ICC. This paper examines the arguments advanced by the United States government regarding the perceived faults with the ICC. Some concerns, such as those regarding perceived violations of sovereignty and unconstitutionality, may be rather easily discounted through an analysis of American history, developments in international law and the text of the Rome Treaty. More realistic concerns, primarily the fear of military embarrassment and the resulting erosion in political capital and the US world leadership position that might occur after the initiation of an internal investigation due to the threat of ICC action, deserve a more thorough discussion. Critics should consider that active American support for the ICC would generate many positive effects for the US, including a chance to shape the development of the Court, increased global security, and the confirmation of the US as a moral leader while transferring onerous ethical watchdog duties to an international organization. The aforementioned threats to American interests are real, but in light of the great benefits the US is poised to receive by working with the ICC, it is in the best interests of the US Senate to ratify the Rome Treaty and commit needed American resources to the ICC. It is left to the American people and politicians to make the ratification of the Rome Treaty a priority for this country, and to open the new age of international accountability that the ICC hopes to engender in the near, rather than distant, future.

INTRODUCTION It is incredibly difficult for the modern American to conceive of a world without private property. In contemporary society, the right to “own” is not just taken for granted, it is a supreme entitlement. Arguably, this entitlement has guided the construction of American institutions and can be seen imprinted over the history of the country. From the Boston Tea Party to the Civil War to the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, private property, and the protection thereof, has brought about massive cultural changes, and is entirely essential to maintaining a capitalist society. However, not all property appears on the same massive world stage, or causes such public controversy and turmoil. As capitalistic society developed around worshiping and cultivating physical private property, we see the development and refinement of intellectual property. As much as anyone is entitled to purchase a pair of shoes, so too can someone write a book and seek legal protection for the words contained within. It would be entirely inaccurate, though, to imply that the world of intellectual property is not without its own controversies. If it was, this paper would not need to exist. Even its very historical foundations and philosophical basis are cause for disagreement, with jurists, philosophers, scholars, and historians all butting heads with each other over the proper interpretation and application. This first section of this paper will discuss and explore the three major theories that explore the defense of intellectual property. While there are more than three theories, most experts agree that these are the major ones. This section will provide crucial insight to understanding the analysis and history explored in sections 2 and 3 of this paper. The first theory in this paper is derived from John Locke’s labor theory of property. Perhaps also the most controversial, Locke’s Labor theory provides a compelling and clear jumping off point. It is also the earliest developed, giving it special historical significance, as it was likely a starting point for every theory which came after it. Though Locke mainly focused on physical property, his ideas can be applied to intellectual property. The second theory explored in this paper is drawn from the Hegelian personality theory of property. Incorporating the work of philosophers beyond Hegel, this theory champions intellectual property protection due to the nature of authorial works containing a manifestation of the author’s soul. The most philosophically complex, and arguably robust, of these three theories, Hegelian defenses of copyright are championed by many scholars. The third and final major theory is the application of utilitarianism. As expanded upon by Mill, utilitarianism provides a compelling analytical decision making tool for societal action. Utilitarian views of copyright see the legal regime as a privilege, not a right, for authors to reap the benefits from incentives of their work. In the second section of this paper, there is a discussion of the history of copyright. Tracing its origins over the course of several centuries, and focusing on critical inflection points in the legal history, this paper aims to give a solid foundation to how America’s current system of copyright came into existence. Over the course of this history, the three aforementioned theories all begin to develop. The history of copyright is more than just debates between writers, publishing houses, and royal charters of monopoly. The history of copyright is a manifestation of society moving from religious to secular. It shows the crumbling of the monarchy and the rise of the individual, exemplified through the newly generated concept known as “the freedom of the press.” The third section of this paper will examine two major cases exploring copyright issues in American theater. Both concern the concept of co-authorship. The first case is Childress v. Taylor, which established a legal test of co-authorship. The following case is Thomson v. Larson which uses the Childress test. In moving the three sections of this paper, the three major theories of intellectual property will become clear in origin, history, and application to real case law. We will see them come to light in copyright cases involving the America theater. Understanding the three major lenses will empower any reader to apply and analyze how this very unique type of property functions and exists in our modern world. This paper will provide thorough analysis and context to provide a familiarity with the legislative history of copyright in America, the cultural context of copyright on a global scale, and will explore the legal conception of co-authorship through cases originating in the world of theater.